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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the allocation among innocent parties of
losses incurred in connection with the collection and payment of
checks bearing forged indorsements.' The discussion covers, in
various degrees of emphasis, (i) jurisdictions that have adopted a
statute modeled on the English Bills of Exchange Act (BEA),2
conveniently, though not always accurately, sometimes referred to
throughout this paper as common law jurisdictions,3 (ii) the United
1. Generally speaking, a forged indorsement is an unauthorized indorsement
other than by an agent who exceeded his authority. For forged drawer's
signature losses, which are outside the present discussion, see Benjamin Geva,
Allocation ofForged Cheque Losses--Comparative Aspects, Policies and a Model for
a Law Reform, 114 L.Q.R. 250 (1998).
2. 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 61 (Eng.).
3. Jurisdictions covered are Canada (Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C., ch. B-4
(1985)); Israel (Bills of Exchange Ordinance [New Version], 1957, 2 L.S.I. 12;
South Africa (Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964); and Australia, where checks
were excluded from the coverage of BEA 1909 and are currently governed by the
Cheques Act, 1986, ch. 145 (Austl.). Strictly speaking, Israel, South Africa, and
1734
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States where the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Articles 3 and
4 apply to checks,4 and (iii) civil law jurisdictions where a statute
modeled on the Geneva Uniform Law on Cheques (UCL) governs
checks.' This paper has several objectives. First, it is designed to
place the UCC scheme in a broader comparative global context.
Second, it will be demonstrated that worldwide developments were
not arbitrary; rather, they responded to competing and often
conflicting policies, so that local differences tend to reflect decisions
based on conscientious policy preferences. Third, this paper will
examine the interaction between policy and doctrine and the role
of law merchant in the evolution of the law in this area.
It will be observed that among the major global systems, the
Anglo-American one is far more complex than its Continental
counterpart. Nevertheless, this paper concludes it is the Anglo-
American scheme which implements the better policies.
Additionally, statutory exceptions to the basic scheme reinforce the
desired policies under the UCC but weaken or undermine these
policies under the BEA. Finally, concrete proposals to revise the
UCC provisions are made with the view of enhancing the
implementation of the desired policies. Specifically, these proposals
are concerned with (i) the restriction and some other modifications
in the application of the conversion remedy,6 (ii) the revision of the
negligence regime, particularly by the elimination of the
comparative negligence rules, and (iii) the encouragement of
voluntary codes of conduct prescribing standards of ordinary care.7
In the past, I expressed the view that "[a] sound scheme
the Province of Quebec in Canada are not common law jurisdictions.
4. Article 3 governs negotiable instruments and Article 4 governs bank
deposits and collections. The current text of Article 3 was enacted in 1990. Its
enactment was accompanied by the passage of conforming and miscellaneous
amendments to Article 4.
5. See Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Cheques, 143 L.N.T.S. 355
(Mar. 19,1931). The Second Geneva Convention adopted this convention as part
of an international effort which further generated the Geneva Uniform Law on
Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes of 1930.
6. See injra Part Hl.C.1.
7. See in/ra Part IV.C.
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allocating forgery losses should be aimed at achieving loss reduction
and loss distribution while not undermining the fundamental
policies underlying the use of negotiable instruments as payment
devises."8 Such fundamental policies were identified as "the free
circulation of commercial paper and the finality of payment."9 The
present study confirms that loss prevention or reduction and free
circulation are competing policies; yet, while historically, with
respect to forged indorsement losses, a response to each one
developed so as to be exclusionary of the other, these policies are
reconcilable, and the objective of formulating a sound scheme
accommodating both policies is, indeed, attainable. However, in the
final analysis, this paper concludes, benefits from risk prevention
or reduction substantially outweigh any potential benefit from free
circulation. This result is because, in practice, checks seldom
circulate or are negotiated other than to a depositary bank. Hence,
the protection of free circulation and finality of payment to an
indorsee neither outweighs nor ought to be reconciled with the
policies of risk prevention or reduction and loss distribution that
underlie the basic scheme of the Anglo-American system.
On a jurisprudential sphere, this paper observes that in the
Anglo-American system, the evolution of the law relating to forged
indorsement supports the view that commercial law is not a distinct
and separate body of legal doctrine but rather the adaptation of
general law doctrines and processes to meet the needs which arise
in commercial transactions. This allows a more integrative view of
commercial law in the context of the broader legal system as a
whole and does not serve to demote commercial law in history or
in practice.
8. Benjamin Geva, Reflections on the Need to Revise the Bills ofExchangeAct,
6 CAN. BUS. LJ. 269, 313-14 (1981).
9. Id
1736
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I. THE BASIC SCHEME iN THE MAJOR SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD
A. Forged Indorsements Under the UCC
The starting point of UCC section 3-403(a) is that "an
unauthorized signature is ineffective."1" "Unauthorized" signature
is defined in the UCC as "one made without actual, implied or
apparent authority and includes a forgery."1 ' Since under section 3-
204, "[i]ndorsement" requires "a signature, "12 it follows that a
forged indorsement constitutes a breach in the chain of title to the
check; it passes neither title nor lawful possession. Title and the
right to possession remain with the original (ex-)holder whose
signature has been forged.
A transferee who derives title, directly or indirectly, through a
forged indorsement is not a "holder" in relation to parties whose
signatures on the check preceded the forgery. This is because no
transferee can become a "holder" without the "negotiation" of the
check to him," and it is the holder's indorsement which negotiates
a check.14 While being in possession of the check, the forger is
neither its named payee nor indorsee, and thus, is not a "holder."'"
Consequently, the taking from the forger, even by indorsement, is
10. U.C.C. S 3-403(a) (1999). This rule is stated to be subject to two
enumerated exceptions and to exist "[u]nless otherwise provided in this Article
or Article 4." Id. The enumerated exceptions pertain to ratification and the
effectiveness of the unauthorized signature to bind the signer. The other
exceptions are discussed infra Part IV.B.
11. U.C.C. S 1-201(43) (1999).
12. U.C.C. § 3-204(a) (1999).
13. See U.C.C. § 3-201(a) (1999). "Negotiation" is the mode of transfer
constituting the transferee "the holder" of the instrument. This paper aims at
maintaining a gender neutral language. It will use "he," "him" and "his" to
equally denote "she," and "her" as well as "it" and "its."
14. See U.C.C. S 3-201(b) (1999). Strictly speaking, the provision speaks of
"an instrument payable to an identified person" rather than to order. See id.
However, undersection 3-109(b), apromise or orderpayable to order "is payable
to the identified person." U.C.C. § 3-109(b) (1999).
15. U.C.C. 5 1-201(20). A holder of a check payable to order is defined as the
identified person in possession of the check. See id
1737
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not "negotiation;" hence, while being an indorsee in possession of
the check identifying him, neither the taker from the forger, nor
any transferee deriving title from him is a "holder."16
By definition, a "holder in due course" must be a "holder. ' 7
Because the acquirer of a check payable to order through a forged
indorsement is not a holder, no one who takes a check subsequent
to a forged indorsement can be a holder in due course in relation to
parties whose signatures preceded the forgery. A holder in due
course obtains clear title to the check, free from claims to it, such
as "a claim of a property or possessory right in the instrument or its
proceeds.""8 This definition would allow a person from whom a
check was stolen and whose signature was forged to claim
ownership. But, as indicated, a forged indorsement precludes
holding in due course, without which forgery could not have been
overcome.
B. Forged Indorsements Under the BEA
The basic scheme of the UCC is modeled on that of the BEA.
In BEA jurisdictions, a forged indorsement constitutes a breach in
the chain of title to the check-"no right to retain the bill 9 or to
give a discharge therefor or to enforce payment thereof against any
party thereto can be acquired through or under [a forged]
signature."" A forged indorsement passes neither title nor lawful
possession.21 Title and the right to possession remain with the
16. Notwithstanding the statutory definition. See id
17. U.C.C. § 3-302 (1999).
18. U.C.C. § 3-306 (1999).
19. Other than in Australia (where checks are excluded from the BEA), a
check is a species of a bill of exchange.
20. See section 24 in the U.K., section 48(1) in Canada, section 23(a) in Israel,
and section 22 in South Africa. In Australia, an indorsement of a check is not
effective unless the indorser signs it. See Cheques Act, 1986, S 41(1)(a) (Austl.).
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the BEA in the United
Kingdom, South Africa, and Canada, to the BEO in Israel; and to the Cheques
Act in Australia.
21. This is also true for a collecting bank in Canada, notwithstanding BEA
1738
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original (ex-) holder whose signature has been forged.
A transferee who derives title, directly or indirectly, through a
forged indorsement is not a "holder" in relation to parties whose
signatures on the check preceded the forgery. This is so because no
transferee can become a "holder" without the "negotiation" of the
check to him, and the negotiation of a check payable to order is
by "the indorsement of the holder."" While being in possession of
section 165(3), providing that "[w]here a cheque is delivered to a bank for deposit
to the credit of a person and the bank credits him with the amount of the
cheque, the bank acquires all the rights and powers of a holder in due course of
the cheque." BEA § 165(3). In Boma Manufacturing Ltd v. Canadian Imperial
Bank ofCommerce (1996), 140 D.L.R. 4th 463, 489 (SCC), after noting the broad
language of the provision, but recognizing its underlying purpose and speaking
on that point for a unanimous court, Justice Iacobucci held that "the 'person' in
section 165(3) must mean a person who is entitled to the cheque," such as "the
payee or the legitimate endorsee." Id. paras. 74 & 76; see generally paras. 69-85.
Justice La Forest ultimately agreed. See id. paras. 107-09. For an earlier authority
in the same direction, see Morguard Trust Co. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1982), 40
O.R.2d 211 (Hi.CJ.), affld (1983), 44 O.R. 2d 384 (C.A.), where justice Maloney
rationalized this rule by stating that
[s]ection 165(3) refers to the "delivery" of a cheque. Section [39] of the
Act states that delivery "in order to be effectual must be made either by
or under the authority of the party drawing, accepting or endorsing.
..." In this case there was no delivery of the cheque within the meaning
of this section and therefore there was no delivery of the cheque within
the meaning of s[ection] 165(3).
Id. at 217. For a contrary view on the effect of section 165(3), seeIan F.G. Baxter,
A Non-Negotiable Crossing, 7 CAN. BUS. L.J. 141 (1982-83). Note that strictly as
a matter of technical statutory interpretation, Justice Maloney's explanation is
not convincing because the quoted provision requires the "endorser" to authorize
"delivery," not the last "endorsee." Justice Iacobucci's policy-oriented
explanation in Boma is thus far more convincing.
22. "Negotiation" is the mode of transfer constituting the transferee "the
holder" of the instrument. See Cheques Act S 40(1) (Austl.); BEA 5 59(1) (Can.);
BEO § 30(a) (Isr.); BEA S 29(1) (S. Afr.); BEA 9 31(1) (U.K.).
23. See section 31(3) in the U.K., section 59(3) in Canada (where
"endorsement" substitutes "indorsement"), section 30(c) in Israel, and section
29(3) in South Africa." See also Cheques Act 5 40(2) (Austl.).
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the check, the forger is neither its named payee nor indorsee, and
thus is not a "holder."'24 Consequently, the taking from the forger,
even by indorsement, is not taking by "negotiation;" hence, while
being an indorsee in possession of the check, neither the taker from
the forger nor any transferee deriving title from him is a "holder."2"
By definition, a "holder in due course" must be a "holder. '26
Because the acquirer of a check payable to order through a forged
indorsement is not a holder, no one who takes a check subsequent
to a forged indorsement can be a holder in due course in relation to
parties whose signatures preceded the forgery. A holder in due
course obtains a clear title to the check "free from any defect of
title, "28 including all adverse claims, 29 which would have covered
the claim of ownership of the person from whom the check has
been stolen, and whose signature has been forged. But as indicated,
a forged indorsement precludes holding in due course, without
which forgery could not have overcome.
24. A holder of a check payable to order is defined as the payee or indorsee
in possession of the check. See Cheques Act § 3 (Austl.); BEA § 2 (Can. and
U.K.); BEO § 1 (Isr.); BEA § 1 (S. Afr.).
25. Notwithstanding the statutory definition. See id.
26. Cheques Act § 50 (Austl.); BEA § 55(1) (Can.); BEO 5 28(a) (Isr.); BEA
S 27(1) (S. Afr.); BEA S 29(1) (U.K.). Each requires a holder in due course to be
a "holder."
27. Consequently, the preclusions of a party from raising forgery against a
holder in due course, discussed in/ra Part II.D., do not benefit a claimant
through a forged indorsement.
28. Cheques Act § 49(2) (Austl.); BEA § 73(b) (Can.); BEO § 37(2) (Isr.);
BEA § 36(b) (S. Afr.); BEA § 38(2) (U.K.).
29. "Defect of title" is the statutory equivalent of the common law "equity
attaching to the bill." Alock v. Smith, [1892] 1 Ch. 238,263. Corresponding to
the duplex nature of the negotiable instrument as both a chattel and a chose in
action, such an "equity" is either as to liability on the instrument or as to its
ownership. Equity as to ownership is an adverse claim. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 HARV. L. REV. 1104, 1109 (1918).
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C. The Dispossessed Owner-s Remedies Under the BEA and the UCC
1. The Payee/True Owner's Remedy
In the common law BEA jurisdictions, the "true owner,"
namely the one from whom the check has been stolen and whose
indorsement has been forged,30 may sue either in conversion or in
money had and received, any person through whose hands the
check passed subsequent to the forgery. Each post-forgery indorsee,
and possibly, the drawee who paid the bill, fall into this category.
In both actions, the defendant need not necessarily be the one in
possession of the check at the time of the action. Furthermore,
under the BEA, having provided an indemnity against any possible
adverse claim, the true owner may sue on the lost check prior
parties liable thereon.31
30. Ownership of an instrument (other than that of a holder in due course)
is established under general principles governing ownership in chattels. See, for
example, in South Africa, First National Bank v. Quality Tyres, 1995 (3) SA 556,
particularly 567-70 (AD), and in Israel, C.A. 144/62, Kupat Aliya v. Kirstein, 17
P.D. 2282, 2286. Kirstein held that a voidable title to an instrument acquired
under a rescindable contract that has not yet been rescinded is nevertheless
ownership. At the same time, the South African case should not be taken to
suggest that in the common law, the transfer of ownership of a chattel requires
the transfer of possession. Anyway, in the facts of that case, and notwithstanding
the court's view to the contrary, it is hard to see why there was not a
constructive delivery of the instrument.
31. In BEA jurisdictions, both actions in conversion and money had and
received are not statutory based. They are thus inapplicable in South Africa and
the Province of Quebec in Canada, which are civil law jurisdictions where the
BEA applies. For a review of the South African position, see, for example, C.
Hugo, The Negligent Collecting Bank- Recent Decision Introduce a New Era, 3
Stellenbosch L.R. 115 (1992). In Quebec, the leading authority for the
inapplicability of the conversion action to checks is Norwich Union Fire
Insurance Society v. Banque Canadienne Nationale [1934] 4 D.L.R. 233 (SCC).
Conversion (with regard to chattels in general) is, however, statutory-based in
Israel under section 52 of the Torts Ordinance [New Version], 1968, 10 L.S.I.
266, as amended. In contrast to the conversion and money had and received
actions, BEA sections 69-70 in the U.K., sections 155-56 of the BEA in Canada,
sections 69-70 of the BEO in Israel, sections 67-68 of the BEA in South Africa,
1741
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Similarly, under the UCC, two options are available to the
dispossessed owner ex-holder of the check. First, he may call on
prior parties liable on the check. Alternatively, he may sue
subsequent parties on the basis of their unlawful interference with
his possession or property right. The former action is governed by
UCC section 3-309. The later is governed by section 3-420.
Under both the BEA and the UCC, I re-examine the role of
conversion, side-by-side with the action for money had and received
in BEA jurisdictions, in implementing of the Anglo-American basic
scheme. In my view, the true owner's action on the lost instrument
provides him with an adequate remedy. Any action against post-
forgery parties unnecessarily adds lawsuits. In providing for
additional defendants, the availability of such an action improves
the true owner's position compared to that which would exist in
the absence of forgery. In any event, there seems to be no difference
in the true owner's burden in proving his entitlement, whether he
sues prior parties on the check or subsequent ones in conversion (or
money had and received); hence, no extra hardship is involved in
limiting his remedy to prior parties. As well, in most cases, the true
owner cannot be said to suffer loss due to the disappearance of the
benefit of negotiability, because regardless of negotiation, he
remains responsible for any defect in his own title.32
It thus seems that the true owner's remedy from a post-forged
indorsement party ought to be limited to the physical return of the
instrument. There appears to be no justified grounds for any
monetary claim. The availability of conversion (or money had and
received) under present law can be viewed as an obsolete remnant
and section 116 of the Cheques Act in Australia govern the action to enforce
liability on a lost instrument.
32. True, when the true owner is an indorsee, who is not a holder in due
course, and who would have managed to transfer the instrument to a holder in
due course, upon the recovery by the latter from the drawer, the true owner is
not exposed to any liability. Yet, this is not the typical situation; usually the true
owner is the payee. Second, use of such a scenario as a basis for an action in
conversion (or money had and received) is tantamount to recognizing a right of
a holder not in due course to the full value of the check. Such a right, however,
does not exist.
1742
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from the archaic rule attributing to an instrument all qualities of a
chattel. It would have followed from such a rule that the physical
loss of the instrument necessarily entails the forfeiture of its entire
economic value in the form of a loss of the right to recover on it.
This, however, is not the law, at least anymore, so that the
conversion (or money had and received) action of the true owner
against a post-forged indorsement party does not appear to be
justified and seems unnecessary in the implementation of the
Anglo-American scheme.
However, upon further reflection, this is true only with respect
to the pre-payment situation, which could arise, for example, in
connection with the left of post-dated checks, whose payment is
thus delayed. After payment for example, in the case of
embezzlement by an employee of the true owner of several checks
payable to the true owner by the true owner's debtors, it may be
more efficient for the true owner to bypass the action against the
various drawers, whose accounts have been already debited, and sue
directly the taker from the forger, usually the forger's bank acting
as a depositary bank, thereby avoiding circuity of action. Indeed,
there is no policy ground to support the involvement in the
litigation of the drawer of a check stolen from the payee, whose
account has been already debited; in this sense, the true owner's
direct remedy against the taker from the forger eliminates wasteful
litigation. I am inclined to propose that conversion (and money had
and received) be limited to post-payment situations, and be
available only against the actual taker from the forger, and not
against anyone deriving title from him. On the other hand, a true
owner to whom conversion (as well as money had and received) is
so available, ought to be required to invoke this remedy first,
before becoming able to pursue any remedy against any prior party.
2. The Drawer's Remedy
Where a complete check payable to order has been stolen from
the drawer and paid over a forged indorsement, the drawer may sue
the drawee in breach of contract for paying the check contrary to
1743
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the drawer's instructions. Such instructions, embodied in the
drawer/customer's order which constitutes the check, were to pay
the check to the payee or to someone deriving title from the payee.
Payment to one claiming through a forged indorsement, that is, to
someone other than to the one who derives title from the payee is
wrongful; it does not discharge the drawer from liability on the
instrument.3 Being contrary to the drawer's instructions, such
payment constitutes a breach of the banking contract between the
drawer/customer and his bank.
In this respect, there is no difference between the UCC and the
basic scheme of the BEA. To some extent, Article 4 of the UCC
codified the point in section 4-401(1), by permitting a bank to
"charge against the account any item which is otherwise properly
payable from that account... ," thereby implicitly indicating that
a bank may not charge to the account an item which is not
"properly payable."34 The provision goes on to state that "[a]n item
is properly payable if it is authorized by the customer and is in
accordance with any agreement between the customer and bank."
The official comment to the UCC clarifies that "[a]n item
containing a forged drawer's signature or forged indorsement is not
properly payable." Accordingly, a drawee bank which pays a check
over a forged indorsement is in breach of duty.
The drawer's remedy under the UCC is only against the drawee
bank. Section 3420 of the UCC specifically settles a pre-1990
Article 3 as well as a BEA controversy by denying the drawer a
conversion action against parties who handled the lost or stolen
check, such as the depository bank or anyone else deriving title
through the forged indorsement." Under the BEA, the prevailing
33. UCC section 3-602(a) states that discharge by payment requires payment
"to a person entitled to enforce the instrument." U.C.C. § 3-602(a) (1999).
Similarly, the Canadian BEA provides that discharge by payment requires
payment to the "holder." BEA § 138 (Can.). One claiming through a forged
indorsement is thus excluded from both definitions.
34. See generally JAMES J. WHiM & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 551 (4th ed. 1995).
35. See U.C.C. § 3420 (1999).
1744
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view is to the contrary, namely, that the drawer from whom a
complete check payable to order was stolen and whose bank paid
over a forged indorsement, may sue a post-forgery party, such as
the depositary bank, in conversion. 6
In denying the drawer's remedy against the depositary bank,
and to that end, in explicitly following the pre-1990 Code-leading
case of Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First National Bank &
Trust Co.,3 Official Comment 1 to UCC section 3-420 explains that
"[t]here is no reason why a drawer should have an action in
conversion." As a matter of doctrine, "[t]he check represents an
obligation of the drawer rather than property of the drawer." To
the same end, as a matter of policy, "[tihe drawer has an adequate
remedy against the payor bank for recredit of the drawer's account
for unauthorized payment of the check." This double rationale is
quite convincing; on this point the departure from the dubious
contrary prevailing view in common law BEA jurisdictions,
facilitating a conversion action by the drawer, is fully justified.
Indeed, being the drawer's bank, the drawee may be in a better
position than the depositary bank to defend against the drawer's
action by invoking defenses based on the drawer's course of
business. Hence, the avoidance of circuity of action by allowing the
drawer remedy against the depositary bank is not convincing.
D. Post-Forgery PartiesRemedies Under the BEA and UCC
Under the BEA, one who derives title through a forged
indorsement is entitled to sue on the check any prior indorser who
took the check subsequent to the forgery. The BEA precludes an
indorser of a check from denying (@ "the genuineness and regularity
... of... all previous indorsement" as well as (ii) that "at the time
36. For a critical analysis of case law, see Benjamin Geva, Conversion of
Unissued Cheques and the Fictitious or Non-Existing Payee-Boma v. CIBC, 28
CAN. BUS. LJ. 177, 186-92 (1997) [hereinafter Geva (Boma)].
37. 184 N.E.2d 358 (Mass. 1962). Pre-1990 Article 3 did not specifically
exclude the drawer's conversion action.
1745
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of his indorsement... he had a good title."38 The former preclusion
runs in favor of a "holder in due course." The latter runs in favor
of an "immediate and subsequent indorsee." In relation to prior
parties who indorsed the check subsequent to the forged
indorsement, the possessor of the check is an "immediate or...
subsequent indorsee" as well as, depending on his compliance with
required statutory conditions of good faith and taking the check for
value,39 a "holder in due course." Effectively then, the two
enumerated statutory preclusions run in favor of all transferees
subsequent to the taker from the forger. On the strength of these
preclusions, "the person in possession of a bill bearing a forged
indorsement is considered a holder against every party who signed
the bill after the forgery of the indorsement."' Being precluded
from asserting the forgery, a post-forgery party is thus liable on the
check to a subsequent indorsee as if the endorsee claims through a
flawless chain of title to an impeccable instrument bearing only
genuine signatures.
No similar provisions exist in the UCC. Nevertheless, a similar
result, namely liability of a post-forged indorsement party to any
subsequent transferee, is achieved by means of an altogether
different technique, the "vendor's warranty."41 The theory is that
a check is a chattel whose vendor warrants title, uninterrupted by
any forged indorsement. Unlike under the BEA, a post-forged
indorsement transferor is not liable to a subsequent transferee on
the check; the transferor is, however, liable to a subsequent
transferee on the breach of warranty.42
38. Cheques Act § 74(1)(b) (Austl.); BEA § 132(b)-(c) (Can.); BEO § 55(b)(2)-
(3) (Isr.); BEA § 53(2)(b)-(c) (S. Mr.); BEA § 55(2)(b)-(c) (U.K.).
39. The precise conditions to be complied with are set out in Cheques Act
S 50(1) (Austl.); BEA § 55(1) (Can.); BEO § 28(a) (Isr.); BEA § 27(1) (S. Mr.);
BEA § 29(1) (U.K.).
40. Aharon Barak, The Uniform Commercial Code Commercial Paper, An
Outsider's View, Part II, 3 ISR. L. REV. 184, 186 (1968).
41. This technique is available under the BEA for an instrument payable to
bearer, on which the transferor is not liable. See, e.g., BEA § 137 (Can.).
42. See Barak, supra note 40, at 180-90.
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Among other matters, 43 the transferor warrants that "[he] is a
person entitled to enforce the [check]," that "all signatures on the
[check] are authentic and authorized," and that "the [check] has not
been altered." This warranty covers the authenticity and validity of
each indorsement and the title to the check. Under UCC section 3-
416, this warranty is made by any "person who transfers an
instrument for consideration.., to the transferee and if the transfer
is by indorsement, to any subsequent transferee." Under UCC
section 4-207, this warranty is made by any "customer or collecting
bank who transfers an item and receives a settlement or other
consideration.., to his transferee and to any subsequent collecting
bank."44 Indeed, this is a vendor's warranty of title, given by each
transferor for value not only to the immediate transferee, but also
to any subsequent indorsee or collecting bank, up to the last
indorsee or collecting bank in the chain,45 and regardless of whether
the claiming beneficiary gave value for the check.46 With respect to
checks, these warranties cannot be disclaimed.47
Transfer warranties under the UCC do not benefit the drawee
of the check, who is neither a transferee, nor a collecting bank,
targeted under sections 3-416 and 4-207." This is quite similar to the
position under the BEA, where the statutory preclusions do not
43. The other enumerated warranties relate to the freedom of the
warrantor's entitlement from any adverse claim or defense and to the warrantor's
lack of knowledge of insolvency proceedings against the drawer.
44. Both provisions are substantially identical. While UCC section 3416
applies to "instruments," section 4-207 applies to "items." A check is both an
"instrument" under Article 3 (section 3-104) and an "item" under Article 4
(section 4-104(a)(9)).
45. In theory, a pre-forged indorsement party will give this warranty to the
ultimate transferee, except that the former is not in breach and thus not liable to
the latter. As under the BEA, a forged indorsement does not trigger any liability
by a pre-forgery party to a post-forgery one.
46. This is fair, because a transferee by way of gift (donee) is able to sue on
an instrument.
47. See U.C.C. % 4-207(d), 3-416(c) (1999). "Transfer warranties may be
disclaimed with respect to any instrument except a check." U.C.C. S 3-416 cmt.
5 (1999).
48. See U.C.C. % 3-416, 4-207.
1747
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1733
run in favor of the drawee. However, in BEA jurisdictions, other
than in Canada, the general law of restitution and mistake governs
the remedy of the drawee bank which paid to one claiming the
check through a forged indorsement. In Canada, the BEA provides
recovery.49 At first blush, the UCC combines these two approaches.
First, it provides in section 3-418(b) for the recovery of a mistaken
payment made over a forged indorsement."0 Second, such recovery
is stated in UCC section 3-418(c) to be subject to defenses based on
either taking the check in good faith and for value, or making a
good faith change of position in reliance of payment. However,
irrespective of such defenses, and in departure from the position in
all BEA jurisdictions, the drawee or payor bank benefits under the
UCC from specific presentment warranties running in its favor and
facilitating recovery on a strict liability basis.
Relevant provisions are UCC sections 3-417 and 4-208."'
Thereunder, when a check is presented for payment, the presenter
and any prior transferor warrants to the drawee 2 that "the
warrantor is, or was, at the time the warrantor transferred the
[check], a person entitled to enforce the [check] or authorized to
obtain payment.., of the [check] on behalf of a person entitled to
enforce the [check]."53 This amounts to a warranty of good title by
virtue of lack of any forged indorsement. The mere presentment of
the check does not trigger the warranty by itself, but rather, it must
be coupled with the drawee's ensuing payment or acceptance.54
To assert the warranty, the drawee must have paid the check in
49. See BEA § 49 (Can.).
50. See U.C.C. § 3-418(b) (1999).
51. For checks, both provisions overlap. Effectively, remedies under section
3-417 supersede those for mistaken payment under section 3-418(b). See U.C.C.
3-418(c) (1999).
52. "There is no warranty made to the drawer under subsection (a) when
presentment is made to the drawee." U.C.C. § 3-417 cmt. 2 (1999).
53. U.C.C. S 3-417(a)(1), 4-208(a)(1) (1999). Other presentation warranties
enumerated in subsection (a) pertain to the fact that the check has not been
altered and to the lack of knowledge as to the fact that the drawer's signature is
unauthorized.
54. See U.C.C. % 3-417(a), 4-208(a) (1999).
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good faith though not necessarily without negligence.5 A defendant
against whom recovery is made may invoke the transfer warranties
all the way down to the taker from the forger on whom the loss
ultimately falls.56
E. Forged Indorsement Under the UCL
The basic scheme under the UCL is diametrically opposed to
that of the BEA and UCC. Under UCL Article 19, "[tlhe possessor
of an endorsable cheque is deemed to be the lawful holder if he
establishes his title to the cheque through an uninterrupted series
of endorsements.... " Nonetheless, under UCL Article 21, where
a person has been dispossessed of a check, notwithstanding the lack
of an uninterrupted series of indorsement on the check, "the holder
in whose possession the cheque has come is not bound to give up
the cheque unless he has acquired it in bad faith or unless in
acquiring it he has been guilty of gross negligence." Such holder
defeats the title of the previous "lawful holder," who has been
dispossessed of the check, and effectively becomes its new lawful
holder. As such, he is entitled to enforce payment on the check
against all parties who became liable on it, whether before or after
the forgery, so that the loss falls on the dispossessed previous lawful
holder or dispossessed owner. Consistent with Article 21, UCL
Article 35 provides that "[t]he drawee who pays an endorsable
check is bound to verify the regularity of the series of
endorsements, but not the signature of the endorsers." Stated
otherwise, a drawee bank is released vis-a-vis the drawer, when it
pays to the holder claiming under what appears to be an
uninterrupted series of indorsement, even when in fact it is
interrupted. Effectively, then, the combined effect of UCL Articles
21 and 35 is to put a bona fide purchaser of an endorsable check on
similar footing with a bona fide purchaser of a check payable to
bearer.
55. See id
56. See id
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Thus, in contrast to both the BEA and the UCC, the UCL
provides for the effectiveness of a forged indorsement. Because it
passes title, no remedies are available to the dispossessed owner,
whether against prior parties on the check or against post-forgery
parties on the basis of any possessory or proprietary right that has
been forfeited under the UCL.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF EACH BASIC SCHEME TO RESPOND TO A
COMPETING POLICY
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, there is a
fundamental difference between Anglo-American (common law)
and Continental (civil law) jurisdictions in their basic attitude
toward the effect of forged indorsements on negotiable instruments,
including checks. In the Anglo-American legal systems, the starting
point is that, subject to specified exceptions which are not uniform
throughout the various jurisdictions, a forged indorsement is
wholly inoperative and may not pass title of an instrument, even to
a bona fide purchaser. 7 Conversely, in the Continental legal
systems, a forged indorsement may pass title of an instrument so
that a holder acquiring an instrument in good faith and without
gross negligence through an uninterrupted series of indorsements
has good title even when the instrument was lost or stolen and one
of the indorsements it bears, is forged."
Consequently, unless a recognized exception is involved, a
drawee bank in an Anglo-American jurisdiction is not discharged
if it pays to someone claiming the check through a forged
indorsement, and the drawee bank may not effectively debit the
drawer customer account with the amount of a check bearing such
a forged indorsement. Conversely, in civil law jurisdictions, the
drawee bank is discharged if it pays the check in good faith to a
holder who can establish his title through an uninterrupted series
of indorsement, even where one is forged; the drawee bank may
57. See supra Part .A.-B.
58. See supra Part II.E.
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then lawfully debit the account of the drawer customer for the
amount of the check.
The Anglo-American basic rule favors the purported indorser
whose signature has been forged, or more generally, the true owner
of the instrument from whom it was stolen at the expense of the
bona fide purchaser of the instrument bearing the forged
indorsement. This rule promotes apolicy of property protection-a
thief may neither forfeit nor pass title, or more generally, no one
can pass property to something, including a negotiable instrument,
not owned by that person. The "true owner" who lost the
instrument or from whom it was stolen, retains his ownership in
the instrument to the exclusion of anyone else, including a bona
fide purchaser, and remains the only one entitled to both sue and
give discharge on it. Among innocent parties, loss ultimately falls
on the taker from the forger.
At the same time, the Continental rule favors the bona fide
purchaser of the instrument bearing a forged indorsement, at the
expense of the purported indorser or true owner, on whom the loss
ultimately falls. This promotes negotiability or currency, namely,
the smooth transferability of instruments from hand-to-hand, free
from adverse claims of ownership, as if negotiable instruments are
money. With respect to stolen instruments, Anglo-American law
effectively preserves this policy, only as to instruments payable to
bearer whose transferability does not require an indorsement.
In providing discharge to a drawee who in good faith paid an
indorsee claiming under a forged indorsement, Continental systems
promote finality of payment. To some extent, these systems
encourage creditors, as potential indorsees, to accept indorsed bills
in payment of debts due to them. True, for a creditor holder of a
check, the loss of the instrument may be tantamount to the loss of
actual money. Yet, once a bill bearing a forged indorsement has
been paid, neither the drawee nor the bona fide indorsee is exposed
to any action. Conversely, in denying discharge from a drawee who
paid over a forged indorsement, Anglo-American law does not
shield the indorsee from the drawee's subsequent restitutionary
claim, thereby undermining finality, and leading to multiplicity of
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remedies: the drawee must re-credit the drawer's account and sue
the recipient, who has recourse from each prior indorser
subsequent to the forgery. Yet, the Anglo-American scheme
encourages debtors to draw and issue bills in payment of debts
because the debtor is protected in case of theft of the bill on its way
from the drawer to the payee. Finally, arguably, the taker from the
forger is typically a more appropriate loss bearer than the innocent
owner from whom the bill has been stolen, as the taker from the
forger needs to be vigilant in scrutinizing the identity of his own
indorser. Consequently, in imposing the risk of loss on the taker
from the forger, compared to its Continental counterpart, Anglo-
American law is more consistent with the policy of risk reduction.59
In addition, insofar as the taker from the forger is not infrequently
a bank, the Anglo-American system implements risk distribution
policy; a bank can pass on to customers and distribute among them
in the form of charges, the cost of both risk reduction measures and
insurance against remaining losses.
These fundamental distinctions between the two major systems
have evolved over the years.' The original position in both
Continental Europe and England was uniformly along the lines of
the basic present Anglo-American approach. Thereunder, forged
indorsement passed no title; thus, the law protected the true
owner's property at the expense of the bona fide indorsee so that
the currency of instruments payable to order was not promoted. In
the course of the eighteenth century, this position was reinforced
in England and commenced to disintegrate in Continental Europe.
The leading English case, decided in 1790, is that of Mead v.
Young.6 It concerned a bona fide indorsee of a bill who acquired it
59. See AHARON BARAK, THE NATURE OF THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
153 (1972) [in Hebrew] [hereinafter BARAK (NATURE)]; Aharon Barak, Forgery
in the Indorsement ofa Bill or Note, 3 MISHPATIM 451, 457-61 (1971) [in Hebrew]
[hereinafter Barak (Forgery)].
60. For an excellent discussion, on which the ensuing analysis draws, see
Friedrich Kessler, Forged Indorsement, 47 YALE LJ. 863, 863-71 (1938).
61. 4 TR 28; 100 Eng. Rep. 876 (K.B. 1790).
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through a forged indorsement." The court dismissed his action
against the drawee/acceptor of the bill.63 According to Kessler,
"[t]he most interesting aspect of the case is that the judges did not
confine themselves to the conventional legal arguments, but talked
for the first time in practical terms and weighed the interests of an
indorsee against those of the other parties."" Speaking for the
majority, Justice Buller rationalized the protection of the true
owner's property on the basis of promoting loss prevention or at
least minimization, finding that
if the [bona fide indorsee] cannot recover on this bill, he
will be induced to prosecute the forger; and that would be
the case even if it had been passed through several hands,
because each indorser would trace it up to the person from
whom he received it, and at last it would come to him who
had been guilty of the forgery: whereas if [the bona fide
indorsee] succeed in this action, he will have no inducement
to prosecute for the forgery; the drawer, on whom the loss
would in that case fall, might have no means of discovering
the person who committed the forgery, and thus he would
probably escape punishment.'
The Chief Justice, Lord Kenyon, did not agree. In his dissent,
he could not "distinguish this case... from that of Miller v. Race,6
where the innocent holder of a note [payable to bearer], which had
been taken when the mail was robbed, was held entitled to
recover."67 In his view, "if the [bona fide indorsee] cannot recover,
it will put an insuperable clog on this species of property.... it
would throw too great a burden on persons taking bills of exchange
to require proof of an indorsee that the person from whom he
62. See 100 Eng. Rep. at 876.
63. See id at 878.
64. Kessler, supra note 60, at 867.
65. Mead, 4 TR 31-32; 100 Eng. Rep. at 878.
66. 1 Burr. 452; 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
67. Mead, 100 Eng. Rep. at 877.
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received the bill was the real payee.""
Effectively concurring withJustice Buller, Justice Ashhurst thus
pronounced the ultimate rule, finding "no title can be derived
through the medium of fraud or forgery" so that "[i]n order to
derive a legal title to a bill of exchange, it is necessary to prove the
handwriting of the payee."' 9 The underlying prevailing policy is
thus that by inquiring into the indorser's title, the indorsee will be
able to eliminate or reduce fraud and resulting losses.
In the same period that the old doctrine was rationalized and
solidified in England, doubts and challenges steadily gained a
foothold in Continental Europe, ultimately leading to the
doctrine's reversal. First, a more limited line of attack emerged in
France in the middle of the eighteenth century.70 This attack did
not challenge the ineffectiveness of the forged indorsement to pass
title; rather, it sought to protect the drawee who paid in good faith
to one claiming over a forged indorsement.7 ' It was pointed out that
a rule requiring the drawee to satisfy himself with the validity of
each indorsement puts a heavy burden on a conscientious drawee
and enables a recalcitrant one to gain time.72 "It was felt that this
result would completely paralyze the use of bills of exchange, the
utility of which depended upon their prompt liquidation at
maturity." 3 Thus, France passed a specific law in 1787, three years
before Mead, which provided a discharge to a drawee who paid in
good faith to an indorsee claiming under a forged indorsement.74
This rule remained effective in France until it adopted the Geneva
Uniform Laws'5 in the 1930s, which enlarged it further to protect
the bona fide indorsee! 6
68. Id
69. Id. at 878.
70. See Kessler, supra note 60, at 865.
71. See id
72. See id at 868-69.
73. Id
74. See id. at 869.
75. See supra Part II.E.
76. See Kessler, supra note 60, at 869.
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A second challenge to the traditional doctrine as to the
ineffectiveness of forged indorsement has developed in Germany.
As of the beginning of the eighteenth century, this challenge was
broader in its scope and proved to be more formidable."" It was
argued that a transferee of a bill of exchange "could only be
expected to examine the external regularity of the chain of
indorsement, '77 and not to go beyond investigating the title of his
own transferor.7' To enhance their role as instruments of
commerce, bills of exchange ought thus to circulate like money."
This currency theory is in fact no different from the dissenting
view of Lord Kenyon in Mead, except that in Germany, it fared
better and became law by the middle of the nineteenth century.
According to Kessler,
[u]nder the new theory the title of a bona fide indorsee is
not in the least derivative, that is, dependent upon the
previous indorser's title, but is completely independent. If
the indorsee is bona fide, i.e., not grossly negligent, he
always acquired title even if his predecessor had none,
provided there is an indorsement to him plus delivery. With
the title he acquires the rights incorporated in the
instrument against all prior parties whose promises are
binding, irrespective of whether there are nonbinding
promises in between, because the individual promises are
independent of each other.8
This currency theory took over and became part of the Geneva
Uniform Law regimeY. It was thus adopted in Continental Europe,
including France, and spread worldwide, other than in the United
77. See id. at 870.
78. Id
79. See id
80. See id
81. Id
82. See id
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States and BEA jurisdictions.'
The UN Convention on International Bills and Notes, which
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) prepared and the United Nations General Assembly
adopted, advanced an interesting compromise position that
purported to bridge the gap between the basic Anglo-American and
Continental approaches.84 Strictly speaking, the Convention does
not apply to checks; its scope, is rather, confined to international
promissory notes and bills of exchange other than checks."
Nevertheless, in so far as it purported to accommodate policies
underlying the laws of both major systems, the particular forged
indorsement rule is of interest to us.86 The Convention adopted the
Geneva Uniform Law rule but added a cause of action in favor of
the "true owner" as against the taker from the forger.' By
protecting the bona fide purchaser, the Convention follows the
Continental rule, thereby enhancing the free circulation and finality
policies.88 At the same time, the true owner's cause of action against
the taker from the forger secures the policy of loss reduction that
Justice Buller pronounced in Mead, and adopted in Anglo-American
law. The scheme undermines finality only in so far as it allows the
true owner to recover from the forger. It encourages creditors to
accept bills in payment of debts due to them as well as encouraging
drawees to pay such bills because both good faith indorsees and
83. See id. at 871.
84. See Report ofthe United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
on the Work of its Twenty-First Session, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 43rd Sess.,
Annex, Agenda Item 131, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/43/820 (1988).
85. See id. at 4.
86. For the position under the Convention, in comparison with both Anglo-
American and Continental laws, see, for example, Carl Felsenfeld, Forged
Endorsements under the United Nations Negotiable Instruments Convention: A
Compromise Between Common and CivilLaw, 45 BUS.LAW. 397 (1989); William
C. Vis, Forged Indorsement, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 547 (1979); see also DENIS.V.
COWEN & L. GERING, COWEN THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN
SOUTH AFRICA 126-27 (5th ed. 1985).
87. See Vis, supra note 86, at 560.
88. See id
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drawees are protected. Compared to the Continental system, some
protection is also accorded to a debtor/drawer who, when the
instrument was stolen in transit to the payee, may sue the taker
from the thiefY
In the final analysis, compared to its Continental counterpart,
and even to ihe UNCITRAL compromise, it is the Anglo-
American system which implements the more desired policies. This
is so because, in practice, checks seldom circulate or are negotiated
other than to a depositary bank.9° Hence, the protection of free
circulation and finality of payment to an indorsee neither
outweighs nor ought to be reconciled with the policies of risk
prevention or reduction and loss distribution, which underlie the
basic scheme of the Anglo-American system. Ironically, however,
in a post-payment situation, my proposal to require the true owner
to sue first the taker from the forger, prior to pursuing his recourse
from any pre-forgery party liable on the instrument, and to
eliminate any other remedy in conversion or money had and
received, though motivated by the avoidance of circuity of action,91
appears to produce a substantially similar result as that under the
UNCITRAL proposal.
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE BASIC SCHEME AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNDERLYING POLICY
The implementation of the free circulation policy has never
89. Evidently, the origin of the scheme, and the basis of the discussion here,
is BARAK (NATURE), supra note 59, at 154-55, and Barak (Forgery), supra note 59,
at 461-65. Aharon Barak co-authored the Draft of the UNCITRAL Convention
and advised the Commission in the ensuing drafting process.
90. A payee who does not deposit the check to a bank account typically
obtains payment through a check cashing facility not operated by a bank. But
even this is not a case of indorsing a check in payment of a debt the payee owes
to the indorsee. For a view defending each of the UCC and the Continental
systems, in its own context, see Eric Wallenbrock, Forged Indorsements under
French Negotiable Instruments Law and the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code: A
Comparative Study, 28 UCC Lj. 393 (1996).
91. For this proposal see supra Part lI.C.1.
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been taken to require the protection of one acting without good
faith. In further requiring a purchaser to act without gross
negligence, the UCL should not be taken to add a considerable
imposition so as to undermine its free circulation policy. Neither
good faith nor absence of gross negligence constitutes a real
exception in the implementation of the free circulation policy
underlying the UCL.
As indicated, the policies underlying the Anglo-American
scheme are those of loss prevention or reduction and loss
distribution. The allocation of losses to the one who deals with the
forger implements loss prevention or reduction. Loss distribution
is achieved due to the fact that, typically, the one who dealt with
the forger is a bank.
The ensuing discussion will consider the role that exceptions to
the Anglo-American basic scheme play in relation to their
underlying policies. It will be observed that while the exceptions
under the UCC reinforce the underlying policies, the exceptions
under the BEA actually undermine these policies. It is perhaps in
this context that it can be properly said, but only in connection
with the BEA and not the UCC, that the allocation of forgery
losses is determined according to "a set of mechanical doctrines 92
making it inadequately responsive to consistent and coherent policy
considerations.
A. Exceptions Under the BEA
No general duty to prevent or detect forgeries exists in BEA
jurisdictions. The absence of such an exception based on negligence,
and the resulting automatic loss allocation to the one who dealt
with the forger even when in the facts of the case it is the fault of
another that caused or could have prevented the loss, is by itself a
setback to the loss prevention or reduction policy. Other setbacks
exist in the form of statutory exceptions or the way they have been
92. Comment, Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries under the Law of
Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 YALE LJ. 417,419
(1953).
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conventionally understood to operate.
1. Checks Payable to Fictitious or Non-Existing Payees93
Legislation in most BEA jurisdictions contains a provision
stating that where the payee is a "fictitious or non-existing person,
the [instrument] may be treated as payable to the bearer."94
Hereinafter, this provision shall be known as "the fictitious payee
provision." In the allocation of forgery losses, the fictitious payee
provision operates to disregard the forgery of the payee's
indorsement on the basis that such indorsement was not required
in the first place. Where the provision applies, its effect is twofold.
First, a bona fide taker for value of the instrument, including a
collecting bank that dealt with the thief, acquires good title. Second,
payment in good faith, even to the thief, is payment in due course
and thus discharges the drawee bank so as to entitle it to credit the
drawer's account. As in the case of theft of an instrument payable
to bearer, and unlike in the usual situation of a theft of an
instrument payable to order, loss thus falls on the person from
whom the instrument was stolen. The provision is of particular
importance in Canada, where in effect, no specific broad
protections against forged indorsement are given to banks collecting
and paying checks.9"
In Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros.,96 shortly after England
93. For previous discussions on which the present text builds, see generally
Geva, (Boma), supra note 36; Benjamin Geva, The Fictitious Payee and Payroll
Padding: Royal Bank of Canadav. Concrete Column Clamps (1961) Ltd., 2 CAN.
Bus. LJ. 418 (1977-78).
94. BEA S 20(5) (Can.); BEO S 6(c) (Isr.); BEA § 7(3) (U.K.). Australian
Cheques Act section 19(1)(b) similarly speaks of a check, specifying as payee or
indorsee "a fictitious or non-existing person," thereby extending the provision
to apply also to the fictitious indorsee. In South Africa, BEA section 5(3)
substitutes "a person not having capacity to contract" for a "non-existing
person." A proposal to amend the South African BEA will repeal this departure
and provide for the standard BEA language.
95. See infra Part IV.A.2.
96. 1891 App. Cas. 107 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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enacted the BEA, the House of Lords understood the fictitious
payee provision to mean that "whenever the name inserted as that
of the payee is so inserted by way of pretence merely, without any
intention that payment shall only be made in conformity
therewith, the payee is a fictitious person within the meaning of the
statute."17 The objective of the provision has thus become the
protection of banks from fraud exercised on the drawer by a third
party, particularly, internal fraud within the drawer organization.
Indeed, the general rule under the BEA is that a forged signature is
not operative, so that the drawer does not usually bear the risk
forged indorsement incurs. Conversely, where the fictitious payee
provision applies, namely when an insider in the drawer
organization defrauds the drawer by generating instruments
intended to be misappropriated, the loss falls on the drawer who is
in a better position to minimize losses and obtain insurance. It is
with the view of implementing this rationale that the fictitious
payee provision ought to have been construed.
However, the technical rules generated in the course of the
judicial interpretation of the fictitious payee provision do not
always meet this challenge successfully. In interpreting the
provision, courts have focused on the meaning of "fictitious" and
"non-existing." In this context, particular attention was given to the
relevance of intention for the application of the provision.
Particularly, courts have been seeking to define "non-existing," as
well as to ascertain whose intention determines whether the payee
is a "fictitious or non-existing person." In thus focusing their
attention on the language of the provision, and thereby overlooking
97. Id. at 153 (Lord Herschell). According to Chalmers, "[d]uring the
controversy [as to the meaning of the provision] the draftsman of the [fictitious
payee provision] must have felt much like the professor of Divinity who was
asked by a student to explain some passage he had written in a theological
tractate. 'My dear friend,' said the professor, 'when I wrote that passage, only
God and I knew what I meant, and now only God knows.'" MacKenzie D.
Chalmers, Vagliano's Case, 7 L.Q. REv. 216, 218 (1891). Yet, Chalmers
continued, "I venture to think that Lord Herschell's judgment ... puts the
matter on a sound and intelligible basis." Id
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the basic policy behind it, courts have failed to see the forest for the
trees.
According to a classic statement of Falconbridge, "[w]hether a
named payee is non-existing is a simple question of fact, not
depending on anyone's intention. The question whether the payee
is fictitious depends upon the intention. of the creator of the
instrument, that is, the drawer of a bill or cheque or the maker of
a note."98 In connection with this statement, a payee who is either
a creature of imagination or a dead person is "non-existing."99 A
payee who is a real person, namely, one who is neither imaginary
nor dead, is "existing." When the drawer inserts the latter's name
by way of pretense, with no intention that he will receive payment,
such a person, though "existing," is nonetheless "fictitious"" so as
still to fall within the ambit of the provision. However, a payee
who is a real, that is, an "existing" person, who was not intended by
the drawer to receive payment, but who becomes payee because of
a third person's fraud of falsely representing to the drawer that the
drawer is indebted to such payee, is neither "fictitious" nor "non-
existing." Thus, this type of payee falls outside the provision. The
intention of the drawer determines whether the payee is-
"fictitious," but not whether he is "non-existing."' 0' In the quoted
language from Falconbridge, while fictitiousness "depends upon the
intention of the.., drawer," existence or nonexistence "is a simple
98. B. CRAWFORD, CRAWFORD AND FALCONBRIDGE BANKING AND BILLS
OF EXCHANGE 1259 (8th ed. 1986). The statement originally appeared in 1956
in the sixth edition.
99. Obviously, this interpretation is broader than "a person not having
capacity to contract," as the South African fictitious provision states. BEA 5 5(3)
(S. Mr.). Hence, the impetus for an amendment. In any event, a check payable
to the estate of a deceased person ought not to fall under the fictitious payee
provision. See DENIS V. COWEN &LEONARD GERING, COWEN ONTHELAW OF
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 70 (4th ed. 1966).
100. For the exclusive relevance of the drawer's intention, see Vinden v.
Hughes, [1905] 1 K.B. 795.
101. For the objective nature of "nonexistence," the leading authority is
Clutton v. Attenborough & Son, 1897 App. Cas. 90 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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question of fact, not depending on anyone's intention."' 2 The two
categories are thus mutually exclusive. °3 First, the "nonexistence"
of the payee is determined objectively. Next, and upon failing to
find the payee to be "non-existing," the "fictitiousness" of the
"existing" payee is settled subjectively, from the point of view of,
and as intended by, the drawer. Otherwise, the provision does not
apply.
In some situations, this interpretation leads to results which are
consistent with the underlying policies of the provision. Thus, the
fictitious payee provision applies when a signing officer defrauds
her corporate employer and draws a check payable to a real creditor
of the company intending to misappropriate the check and its
proceeds.'4 The result will not change when the payee's name was
the product of the signing officer's imagination. The result is
however less straight forward when the fraud perpetrator was an
employee of the drawer company who did not sign the check, as
for example in "payroll padding."
A leading case in Canada is Royal Bank of Canada v. Concrete
Column Clamps (1961) Ltd." 5 In their judgments, members of the
supreme court dealt with the situation of a fraudulent insider who
was not the signer, but rather the one who either supplied the
payees' names to, or prepared the checks for signature by, the
authorized signing officer. 6 The majority held that in such
102. See supra text accompanying note 98.
103. This is true only because the provision expressly specifies these two
categories. In South Africa, where the "non-existing" category is not provided
for, and notwithstanding a South African authority to the contrary, see Nedbank
v. Window Press, 1987 (3) SA 761 (SE). I am attracted by Cowen and Gering's
argument, see supra note 99, at 71, according to which there is nothing to
preclude "fictitious" from being broad enough to include "non-existing."
Undoubtedly, apart from language, there is no policy ground to support the
exclusion of the check payable to a "non-existing" person from the coverage of
the South African provision.
104. See, e.g., Fok Cheong Shing Invs. Co. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981),
123 D.L.R.3d 416 (Ont. Ct. App.), afd, (1982), 146 D.L.R.3d 617 (SCC).
105. (1976), 74 D.L.R.3d 26 (SCC).
106. See id. at 43.
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circumstances, the fictitious payee provision did not apply to
checks made out to "existing" past employees."0 The ensuing loss
thus did not fall on the drawer. While the fraudulent clerk was
truly not "the creator of the instrument" within Falconbridge's
summary,'" inasmuch as the fraud was internal to the drawer
organization, this interpretation is a clear victory of form over
substance which fails to bring the interpretation of the provision in
line with its rationale. This becomes particularly obvious in light
of the fact that in the facts of the case, checks payable to "non-
existing" persons, whose names the fraudulent clerk equally
supplied to the signer, were held to fall within the ambit of the
provision because "existence" is an objective fact determined
irrespective of anyone's intention °9
It is clear, then, that the current interpretation of the fictitious
payee provision, as correctly reflected in Falconbridge's summary,
is less than a perfect tool to allocate internal fraud losses on the
drawer. Efforts ought to be made for judicial improvement,1 if not
107. See id. at 44.
108. See supra text accompanying note 98.
109. See supra text accompanying note 98. In the facts of the case, the
distinction between "non-existing" and "fictitious" became even somewhat
surrealistic as some of the "non-existing" persons were names taken from the
telephone book. Seesupra text accompanying note 98. It is hard to see why such
names are of "non-existing" persons while names of past employees were of
"existing" persons who failed to be "fictitious" only due to the absence of
fraudulent intent by the signer. Unless, of course, "existence" requires some
actual dealings with the defrauded company so that names randomly picked from
the telephone book, and belonging to persons with no past or present contact
with the company, cannot be of "existing" persons.
110. In this context, note Chief Justice Laskin's dissent in Concrete Column
Clamps, concludingthat the namedformer employees were "fictitious," since due
to the purely mechanical role of the authorized signer, it is the intention of the
dishonest clerk, and not the authorized signer, that the court should attribute to
the drawer company. See Conrete Column Clamps (1976), 74 D.L.R.3d at 38-43.
Supporting the result, Justice Spence added in his dissent that in the facts of the
case, the bank was not "guilty of any negligence whatsoever," while for the
drawer, "it would have been quite easy in proper office management to have
designed sufficient methods of checking and verifying to have defeated [the
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for a legislative amendment."' Regrettably, at present, courts focus
their attention on the language of the fictitious payee provision
rather than on the provision's underlying policies.
A further unjustified departure from both policy and
jurisprudence took place in Boma Manufacturing v. Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce. In Boma, a bookkeeper/payroll clerk
with signing authority for two associated companies, fraudulently
prepared checks, ostensibly on behalf of her corporate employers,
intending to misappropriate their proceeds. The clerk made some
checks payable to existing employees and other checks payable to
an imaginary person. She signed some checks herself, but procured
on other checks the signature of an innocent, unsuspecting
shareholder/officer who also had signing authority. The clerk
collected all such checks for her own use."'
It seems, that inasmuch as internal fraud caused the loss, the
companies should have borne it entirely. Speaking for the majority
of the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Iacobucci nevertheless
thought that the fictitious payee provision did not apply to any of
the checks, and he shifted away the entire loss from the
companies." 4 In his view, for the provision to apply, a fraudulent
intent by a guiding mind, and not a mere employee of the company
is required. Stated otherwise, in reference to Falconbridge's
summary, it is only a guiding mind of the company, and not any
authorized signer, that could truly be described as "the creator of
dishonest clerk's] scheme." Id. at 46. See also Peter E. Salvatori, Vagliano's Case
Revisited, 3 CAN. Bus. LJ. 296 (1978-79); Michael Yong Haron, Revisiting
Section 7(3) ofthe Bills ofExchangeAct 1882:An EconomicAnalysis, 29 CAMBRIAN
L. REv. 53 (1998) (both effectively arguing for the application of the provision
in connection with "fictitious" transactions, that is where the corporate customer
has not intended any valid business transaction).
111. Such alegislative amendment could be similar to pre-1990 UCC section
3-405, as set forth in ChiefJustice Laskin's judgment in Concrete Column Clamps.
See Concrete Column Clamps (1976), 74 D.L.R.3d at 39. The current UCC
provision is UCC section 3-404.
112. (1996), 140 D.L.R.4th 463 (SCC).
113. See id at 467-68.
114. See id. at 479-81.
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the instrument."
In the final analysis, by allocating forgery losses to the
organization from which they emanated, the fictitious payee
provision is designed to promote loss prevention or reduction. It is,
however, its interpretation side-by-side with the absence of any
complementary provision allocating losses to a negligent party, that
has effectively undermined, or at least failed to fully implement,
loss prevention or reduction policies.
2. Specific Protections to Drawee and Collecting Banks
A limited application of the French rule protecting the drawee
who paid in good faith over a forged indorsement, applicable to
checks only, crossed the English Channel and was incorporated
into the English Stamp Act of 1853.115 This application has
remained a feature of English law to this very day as the most
prominent exception to the dogma under which the forged
indorsement does not pass title. While spreading to other BEA
jurisdictions, at least in the Anglo-American context, this rule has
never crossed the Atlantic, and has not found its way to North
America. It is not law in both the United States and Canada. The
latter may in fact be the only BEA jurisdiction not to have any
variation of such a rule.
Accordingly, in connection with a check paid over a forged
indorsement, so far as the protection of the drawee is concerned,
the Anglo-American system may be divided into the English and
American variants or subsystems, with Canada being the only BEA
jurisdiction to adhere to the American subsystem. Between the two
subsystems, it is the American subsystem that faithfully follows the
Anglo-American orthodox approach by not providing for any
protection to a drawee who paid over a forged indorsement.
Like the American or the Anglo-American orthodox approach,
the English variant initially allocates the loss to the taker from the
115. 1853, 16 & 17 Vict. 59, S 19 (Eng.). See also JAMES M. HOLDEN,
HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs iN ENGUiSH LAW 222-29 (Win. Gaunt
& Sons 1993) (1955).
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forger. Notwithstanding the discharge of the check by the drawee's
payment over the forged indorsement, the taker from the forger
remains liable to the true owner.116 However, in departure from the
American variant, the English model does not shield the drawer
from the paying drawee's action or from debiting the drawer's
account. Consistently, and thus unlike the American variant, the
English model provides for the discharge of the check by the
drawee's payment, so as to release the drawer from his engagement
on both the check and the contract for which it was given. As
under the Continental scheme, following the payment of the check,
the drawer under the English variant is not exposed to an action by
a subsequent party.
Arguably, where the check was stolen from the drawer, the
drawer may, under the English variant, pursue his recourse from
the taker from the forger." 7 Regardless, when the taker from the
forger was the drawee bank, loss may fall under the English variant,
as in the Continental scheme, on the person from whom the check
was stolen. Because the check was discharged by the drawee's
payment to the thief, the theft victim has no cause of action on the
check. Where the theft victim is the drawer, the loss thus falls on
him.
Compared to the current Continental scheme, the English
variant provides only limited encouragement to creditors to accept
indorsed checks in payment of debts due to them. Under the
English variant, as under the Anglo-American orthodox position,
an indorsee through a forged indorsement is not protected from the
true owner's action. Nor does the indorsee through a forged
indorsement have a cause of action against parties who signed the
bill prior to the forgery. Indeed, unlike the American variant, the
English subsystem bypasses the drawer's action to have his account
re-credited, as well as the drawee's ensuing restitution claim against
116. Obviously, the true owner may recover from the person who the
drawee bank paid, and in fact, from any prior indorsee, from the taker to the
forger, against whom each has recourse.
117. Presumably, this would be the bank's action for payment made under
a mistake of fact for which the drawer is subrogated.
1766
2000] FORGED CHECK INDORSEMENTLOSSES
the recipient. However, compared to the Continental scheme, the
English variant does not eliminate the true owner's action. The
principal benefit accorded by the English variant is the
encouragement given to the drawee to pay, because as under the
present Continental scheme, having paid a check bearing a forged
indorsement, the drawee is shielded from both the drawer's and
true owner's actionsIB8
In the United Kingdom, the principal provision currently
giving special protection to a bank drawee of a demand draft is BEA
section 60 providing that,
when a bill payable to order on demand is drawn on a
banker, and the banker on whom it is drawn pays the bill
in good faith and in the ordinary course of business, it is not
incumbent on the banker to show that the indorsement of
the payee or any subsequent indorsement was made by or
under the authority of the person whose indorsement it
purports to be, and the banker is deemed to have paid the
bill in due course, although such indorsement has been
forged or made without authority."'
This provision has a parallel in BEA jurisdictions other than
Canada. 2° In the United Kingdom, it succeeded, and so far as
118. See BARAK (NATURE), supra note 59, at 154.
119. BEA § 60 (U.K).
120. In Australia, BEA section 65(1) corresponds to BEA section 60 in the
U.K. For checks, however, Cheques Act section 94(1) supersedes BEA section
65(1). Section 94(1) substitutes "without negligence" for "in the ordinary course
of business." In South Africa, it is BEA section 58 which corresponds to BEA
section 60. However, the South African provision adds a qualification-no
protection is given to a drawee bank that paid over a forged indorsement that
purports to be that of a customer at the branch on which the bill of exchange is
drawn. That is, a banker is conclusively presumed to know the signature of his
customer, not only as a drawer of a check drawn on an account held with the
banker, but also as an indorser on someone else's check. It is currently proposed
to delete this proviso. Finally, in Israel, BEO section 23(c), which corresponds
to English BEA section 60, is not limited to a bill payable to order on demand
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checks are concerned, superseded121 section 19 of the Stamp Act of
1853.12 Effectively, BEA section 60 turns the drawee bank's
payment of a check over a forged indorsement, "in good faith and
in the ordinary course of business," into "payment in due course."
Such payment releases the drawer from his engagement on the
check and the debt paid by it.' 23 Accordingly, it authorizes the
drawee to debit the drawer's account, irrespective of the fact that
payment was not made to the holder, but rather, contrary to the
drawer's instructions, to someone claiming under a forged
indorsement. As discussed, this provision does not affect the true
owner's remedy against any party subsequent to the forged
indorsement, and hence, the ultimate loss allocation to the taker
from the forger when such a person exists. 24 Its effect is merely to
drawn on a banker. Rather, it applies to any type of bill exchange, whether or
not drawn on a bank, and whether payable on demand or at a fixed or
determinable future time.
121. See Carpenters' Co. v. British Mut. Banking Co., [1938] 1 K.B. 511.
122. See English Stamp Act, 1853, 16 & 17 Vict., ch. 59, S 19 (Eng.).
Thereunder,
any [d]raft or [o]rder drawn upon a [blanker for a [s]um of [m]oney
payable to [o]rder on [djemand which shall, when presented for
[playment, purport to be endorsed by the [p]erson to whom the same
shall be drawn payable, shall be a sufficient [a]uthority to such [b]anker
to pay the [a]mount of such [d]raft... to the [b]earer thereof; and it
shall not be incumbent on such [b]anker to prove that such
[e]ndorsement, or any subsequent [e]ndorsement, was made by or under
the [d]irection or [aluthority of the [pierson to whom the said [d]raft or
[o]rder was or is made payable either by the [d]rawer or any [elndorser
thereof.
Id. Unlike that of its successor, BEA section 60, the quoted language does not
appear to require the bank claiming the protection to have acted in good faith
and in the ordinary course of business.
123. See Charles v. Blackwell, 2 C.P.D. 151 (1877). See also Kessler, supra
note 60, at 879.
124. See Arnold v. Cheque Bank, 1 C.P.D. 578 (1876); Ogden v. Benas, 9
C.P. 513 (1874); see also BARAK (NATURE), supra note 59, at 120. Consider the
following example: a check payable to order is stolen from the payee and
ultimately paid to thief's indorsee. As the true owner of the check, the payee
may recover from thief's indorsee, regardless of whether section 60 exits.
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insulate the drawee bank from any involvement in the dispute
concerning the forged indorsement. At the same time, in the
absence of an innocent indorsee from the forger, the provision may
shift losses away from the drawee bank, as the person who dealt
with the forger, to the dispossessed owner. Due to the discharge of
the check under the provision, the dispossessed owner is left with
no cause of action.
BEA section 60 does not specifically require the drawee bank to
act without negligence. It is, however, disputed whether the bank's
"ordinary course of business" does not require it anyway to act
without negligence.1"
For crossed checks requiring payment solely to a bank
account, 26 banks in BEA jurisdictions enjoy additional protection.
In the United Kingdom, BEA section 80z" states that,
Alternatively, in the absence of section 60, the payee may sue the drawer, who
will then be able to resist the debit to his account, in which case, the drawee will
recover from the thief's indorsee. Either way, the loss falls on the thief's
indorsee.
125. See E.P. ELLINGER&EVALOMNICKA, MODERN BANKING LAW 378-79
(2d ed. 1995); HOLDEN, supra note 115, at 227-29. Both disapprove of Justice
Slesser's dicta in Carpenters Co., [1938] 1 K.B. at 534, under which "[n]egligence
does not necessarily preclude the protection of [section] 60." But see M.
Gottesman, Forged Indorsements and Bankers' Liability, 7 IS. L. REV. 65, 92-96
(1972), in whose view, ordinary course of business and lack of negligence are
"[iclearly... two concepts which can each be given independent content." For
the "ordinary course of business" requirement, see MARK HAPGOOD, PAGET'S
LAW OF BANKING 383-84 (11th ed. 1996).
126. A crossed check is a check bearing across its face two parallel traverse
lines, with or without between them the word "bank," either with or without
the words "non-negotiable." It must be paid solely into a bank account. The
UCC does not provide for check crossing, and it is not practiced in Canada.
Elsewhere, namely in UCL, as well as in BEA jurisdictions other than Canada,
cheque crossing is a quite common practice.
127. To whom correspond BEO section 80 in Israel and BEA section 79 in
South Africa. In Australia, Cheques Act section 92 is to substantially the same
effect. In Canada, English BEA section 80 is reproduced almost verbatim as BEA
section 173. This may be one reason why check crossing is uncommon in
Canada, where in the absence of a counterpart to English BEA section 60,
crossing will give the drawee bank protection to which it is not entitled
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[w]here the banker, on whom a crossed cheque ... is
drawn, in good faith and without negligence pays it, if
crossed generally, to a banker, and if crossed specially, to
the banker to whom it is crossed, or his agent for collection
being a banker, the banker paying the cheque, and if the
cheque has come into the hands of the payee, the drawer,
shall respectively be entitled to the same rights and be
placed in the same position as if payment of the cheque had
been made to the true owner... thereof.129
The provision substitutes "without negligence" for "in the ordinary
course of business." As indicated, the latter may include the former,
so that for crossed checks, the defenses may overlap. There is,
however, an Australian authority13 suggesting that there may be
circumstances where a bank acts without negligence outside the
ordinary course of its business.131 For crossed checks, the defense of
BEA section 80 may thus be broader than that of BEA section 60.132
In any event, payment against an absent or irregular
indorsement is arguably both outside the ordinary course of
business as well as negligent, so as to provide no protection to the
drawee bank under either section 60 or section 80. In the United
Kingdom, section 1(1) of the 1957 Cheques Act'33 added
otherwise.
128. For the view that in connection with crossing "the expression ["true
owner"] bears a specialized meaning derived from the context of the legislative
enactment in which it occurs and its historical origin," see First National Bank v.
Quality Tyres, 1995 (3) SA 556,567-69 (AD). Nonetheless, in my view, the better
position is the one stated in C.A. 144/62, Kupat Aliya v. Kirstein, 17 P.D. 2282,
under which also in this context the term "true owner" ought to be defined by
reference to general property law.
129. BEA § 80 (Eng).
130. See Australian Mut. Provident Soc. v. Derham (1979), 39 F.L.R. 165
(Austl.).
131. See id
132. Note however, that while the drawer is explicitly protected only under
BEA section 80, it is effectively equally protected under BEA section 60.
133.5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 36 (1957) (Eng.) This statutory section corresponds to
Cheques Act section 94(2) in Australia and BEA section 83 in South Africa. No
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complementary protection, covering cases of irregularity in, or
absence of indorsement, providing that,
[w]here a banker in good faith and in the ordinary course of
business pays a cheque drawn on him which is not indorsed
or is irregularly indorsed, he does not, in doing so, incur
any liability by reason only of the absence of, or irregularity
in, indorsement, and he is deemed to have paid it in due
course.13
4
"Irregularity" is not defined, and is broad enough to cover a forged
indorsement. On the other hand, it was questioned whether
protection is not limited only to situations where indorsement is
not asked for, as the Act permits in connection with the deposit of
checks, but nevertheless appears. 35
In addition to the protection given to the drawee bank, BEA
jurisdictions provide protections to collecting banks handling
checks bearing forged indorsements and acting in good faith and
without negligence.' 3' In the United Kingdom, the current
provision is section 4 of the Cheque Act of 1957137 which provides,
in its pertinent part, as follows:
(1) Where a banker, in good faith and without
negligence
(a) receives payment for a customer of [a check]; or (b)
having credited a customer's account with the amount of [a
check], receives payment thereof for himself; and the
corresponding provision exists in Israel and Canada.
134. Cheques Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 36, 5 (1) (1957) (Eng).
135. For both points, see F.R. RYDER & A. BUENO, BYLES ON BILLS OF
EXCHANGE 301-03 (26th ed. 1988).
136. In Israel, underBEO section 82, andin Canada, under BEA section 175,
this protection is limited to crossed checks. Note that in Canada, the practice of
check crossing does not exist.
137. Cheques Act, 1957, 586 Eliz. 2, ch. 36, S 4 (Eng.). In Australia, Cheques
Act section 95(1) corresponds to the U.K. Cheques Act section 4(1), but is not
identical in its language.
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customer has no title, or defective title, to the [check], the
banker does not incur any liability to the true owner of the
[check] by reason only of receiving payment thereof.
(3) A banker is not to be treated... as having been
negligent by reason only of his failure to concern himself
with absence of, or irregularity in, indorsement of [a
check]. 138
Protections given to paying and collecting banks undermine the
policies of loss prevention or reduction and loss distribution in
several ways:
1) As indicated, it is not settled whether in order to benefit
from the statutory protection, a drawee bank in the UK
need have acted without negligence. Protection afforded to
a negligent bank undoubtedly undermines the policy of loss
prevention or reduction.
2) Fastening liability on banks regardless of their lack of
negligence is likely to produce more stringent loss
prevention policies than where liability is based on
negligence alone.
3) The combined effect of protecting both collecting and
drawee banks is to shift losses away from banks to
customers. When the forger dealt directly with the
depositary bank, loss is shifted to the dispossessed owner.
Regardless, reallocation of losses from banks seriously
undermines loss distribution. Furthermore, assuming both
the dispossessed owner and the bank which dealt with the
forger were not negligent, it is the bank which is capable of
maintaining more rigorous loss prevention policies.
Accordingly, to say the least, no gain in loss prevention or
reduction is realized so as possibly to offset the erosion in
the loss distribution policy occurring upon shifting losses
away from banks.
138. Cheques Act, 1957, 586 Eliz. 2, ch. 36, § 4(1), (3) (Eng.).
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B. Exceptions Under the UCC
1. Introduction: The Role of Negligence
As under the BEA, the basic UCC scheme is subject to
exceptions. It is, however, in relation to the scope of such
exceptions that major differences between the two sub-systems lie.
First, unlike in BEA jurisdictions other than Canada, no special
protections to collecting and drawee banks are provided for in the
UCC. Second, to a large extent, fault principles supercede the UCC
loss allocation scheme, fastening responsibility on negligent parties.
A general provision to that effect is accompanied by a series of
provisions, applicable in prescribed circumstances, allocating losses
to parties in whose sphere of control or influence the fraud that
generated the losses was precipitated. No similar provisions exist
under the BEA, other than the one dealing with the fictitious
payee.
Statutory exceptions to the general scheme, premised on fault
or negligence, are enumerated in UCC sections 3-404 to -406.139
Their combined effect is to reinforce the loss prevention or
reduction under the basic scheme.
Only "a person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes
it for value or for collection" may invoke these exceptions." Stated
otherwise, "good faith" is an indispensable pre-requisite for any
variation in the basic scheme. "Good faith" is defined in section 3-
103(a)(4) of the UCC as "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.' 1 41 While this
includes an objective component of "observance of reasonable
commercial standards," the latter are stated to relate only to "fair
dealing" and not the conduct in business in general. 42
This is not to say, however, that the negligence of one who
invokes a statutory exception premised on the negligence of
139. See U.C.C. % 3-404 to -406 (1999).
140. See U.C.C. % 3-404(a), -404(b)(2), -405(b), -406(a) (1999).
141. Apiw. m 3-103(a)(4) (1999).
142. A point well made in WHMT & SUMMRS, supra note 34, at 572-73.
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another is not pertinent. In each of the three provisions such
negligence is relevant, though in a different way than the breach of
the good faith requirement. It is relevant not as a complete bar to
relying on the exception, but rather, merely for the purpose of
ascertaining the amount of the loss to be allocated to each party.
Accordingly, having failed "to exercise ordinary care in paying or
taking the instrument" so as to substantially contribute'43 to loss, a
person who, in good faith, paid or took the check for value or for
collection; becomes liable to the person bearing the loss to the
extent the failure to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss.'"
The principle is then of comparative negligence, under which loss
is apportioned according to the degree of fault substantially
contributing to the loss.
Typically, the person dealing with the forger is a depositary
bank or a check cashing facility. A failure to exercise ordinary care
occurs, for example, when a check payable to a corporation is
indorsed and/or deposited to an account of an individual, where the
identity of an indorsee or account holder is not adequately
scrutinized, and where suspicious account operation is overlooked.
In such cases, compliance with reasonable commercial standards
could have facilitated the detection of the forgery, and hence the
prevention of the loss. 45
A forged indorsement that becomes effective under UCC
sections 3-404 to 406 is a complete defense to a drawee's action for
the breach of presentment warranties under UCC sections 3-417
and 4-208.1't While this is logical, the statutory language could,
however, be improved by protecting the person invoking any of
the former three Article 3 provisions only to the extent that he did
not substantially contribute to the forgery, namely, only beyond
his share in the loss under the comparative negligence rules that the
143. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.a. Both "ordinary care" and
"substantially contributed" are discussed in connection with UCC section 3406.
144. See U.C.C. § 3-404(d), -405(b), and -406(b) (1999).
145. See, e.g., John M. Norwood, Bank Negligence and the Forgery Doctrine,
115 BANKING LJ. 254, 262-69 (1998).
146. See U.C.C. SS 3-417(c), 4-208(c) (1999).
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applicable provision provides.1 47
2. The Statutory Provisions
a. UCC 5 3-406: Negligence Contributing to Forgery
The general fault or negligence principle is pronounced in UCC
section 3-406(a):
A person whose failure to exercise ordinary care
substantially contributes to an alteration of an instrument
or to the making of a forged signature on an instrument is
precluded from asserting the alteration or the forgery
against a person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or
takes it for value or for collection.
For a person engaged in business, "ordinary care" is defined in
terms of the "observance of reasonable commercial standards,
prevailing in the area in which the person is located, with respect
to the business in which the person is engaged."' 49 The
"substantially contributes" language is designed to preclude the
application of strict proximation requirements between the
147. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 34, at 605-11. They correctly point
out, for example, that when the drawee shared ten percent of the responsibility
and the depositary bank was responsible for fifty percent of the loss (with the
remaining forty percent being allocated to the customer of the depositary bank
with whom the drawee bank settled), literal reading of UCC section 4-208(c)
(and hence UCC section 3-417 as well) results in the depositary bank being fully
protected against the drawee's breach of presentment warranty claim, thereby
avoiding paying its share.
148. U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (1999).
149. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1999). For a bank, in connection with the
automated collection and payment of checks, reasonable commercial standards
may not require a physical examination of each check. This, however, is
inapplicable to a depositary bank. Support for the latter proposition is implied
in UCC section 3-103 comment 5. Seealso WHITE &StMMERs, supra note 34, at
578.
1775
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1733
negligent conduct and the causation of the loss."' Negligent
conduct substantially contributing to a forged indorsement could
include the mailing of a check to a person with a name identical or
similar to that of the intended payee,'' handling incoming as well
as outgoing checks so as to facilitate unauthorized access and theft
either by outsiders or unauthorized personnel," 2 and hiring
inappropriate staff for sensitive positions with inadequate scrutiny.
Negligence could lead to the forgery of either one's own or of
another's signature.53
b. Introduction to UCC 5 3-404 and -405
Provisions listing specific exceptions to the general scheme are
UCC sections 3-404 and -405, respectively dealing with checks54
issued to impostors and to unintended or fictitious payees, and
checks fraudulently indorsed by employees entrusted with
responsibilities. In each case, the UCC provides for the effectiveness
of the fraudulent indorsement in favor of a person who, in good
faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value or for collection.
Thereby, the UCC validates both title derived through the
fraudulent indorsement and payment made over it. As discussed
below, while an unintended or fictitious payee under UCC section
150. See U.C.C. S 3-406 cmt. 2 (1999).
151. SeeU.C.C. S 3.406 cmt. 3, case 2 (1999); Park State Bank v. ArenaAuto
Auction, Inc., 207 N.E.2d 158 (1. App. Ct. 1965). For the incorrect designation
by the drawer of the payee's name as negligence contributing to a forged
indorsement, see Dominion Construction, Inc. v. First National Bank ofMaryland,
315 A.2d 69 (Md. 1974).
152. See U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 3, case 1 (1999).
153. For case law under the pre-1990 UCC, wherein courts considered
whether particular acts constituted negligence substantially contributing to
forgery, see Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Com mercial Paper: What Amounts to
"Negligence Contributing toAlteration or UnauthorizedSignature"under UCCS 3-
406, 67 A.L.R.3d 144 (1975).
154. By their terms, both provisions apply to all types of instruments. The
official comments recognize, however, that they are primarily important with
respect to checks.
1776
2000] FORGED CHECK INDORSEMENTLOSSES
3-404(b) is not substantially different from a fictitious or non-
existing payee under the BEA, section 3405 complements this
provision because it covers instances of fraudulent indorsement by
employees entrusted with responsibility with respect to checks
which may fall outside section 3-404(b). There is no BEA parallel
to UCC section 3405.
For UCC sections 3404 and 405 to apply, the fraudulent
indorsement of the check, which these provisions render effective,
ought to have been made in the name of the person to whom the
check is payable. However, under both provisions, such
indorsement includes (i an indorsement in a substantially similar
name, and (ii) the deposit of the check, whether indorsed or not, in
a depositary bank, to an account in a name substantially similar to
that of that person.'
Loss is thus allocated under both UCC sections 3404 and 405
to the best loss avoider within whose sphere of influence forgery
was precipitated, so that it was either caused or not prevented due
to the fault of that person."5 6 The principle underlying both
provisions is that of fault or negligence substantially contributing
to the forged indorsement and the resulting loss. In fact, both
provisions state an irrebuttable presumption of such fault or
negligence in each specific situation they delineate.
c. The Impostor Rule: UCC § 3-404(a)
UCC section 3-404(a) deals with the case where a fraudster
either impersonates or poses as an agent for a legitimate payee and
induces the issue, either to him in person or to a person acting in
concert with him, of a check payable to the legitimate payee. The
inducement may take place "by use of the mails or otherwise;"
actual face-to-face impersonation is not required.5 7 The provision
extends also to the case where the impostor impersonates an agent
155. See U.C.C. % 3-404(c), -405(c) (1999).
156. See generally U.C.C. § 3-404 cmt. 2 (1999); U.C.C. 9 3-405 cmt. 1 (1999).
157. A point elaborated in pre-1990 UCC section 3-405 comment 1, the
predecessor of current UCC section 3-404.
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of the legitimate payee, which is an expansion of the former UCC
corresponding provision."5 8 The provision thus applies whenever
the impostor impersonates a real creditor of the drawer, as well as
when he impersonates an agent for such a creditor or for a charity
to which the drawer wishes to pay. The former provision excluded
a drawer, who having dealt with one impersonating an agent,
nevertheless "[took] the precaution of making the instrument
payable to the principal" and thereby became "entitled to have [the
principal's] indorsement." '59 The old provision thus shifted the loss
in such a case to the taker from the forger. This rationale is
specifically rejected and loss is reallocated to such a drawer,
notwithstanding the precaution taken."6 No corresponding
provision to the impostor rule exists under the BEA. 6'
d. The Fictitious Payee Rule: UCC § 3-404(b)
UCC section 3-404(b) deals with a check issued to an
unintended or fictitious payee,'62 and it covers two situations. First,
subsection (b)(i) applies to the case where "a person whose intent
determines to whom an instrument is payable.., or does not
intend the person identified as payee to have any interest in the
instrument."63 Second, subsection (b)(ii) applies where "the person
identified as payee of an instrument is a fictitious person.""' In
either case, anyone in possession of the instrument is its holder and
any indorsement in the payee's name is effective as the payee's
indorsement "in favor of a person who, in good faith, pays the
instrument or takes it for value or for collection."'65 Effectively
158. The former provision was pre-1990 UCC section 3-405(1)(a).
159. Official Comment 2 to pre-1990 UCC section 3-405.
160. See U.C.C. § 3-404 cmt. 1 (1999).
161. Arguably, however, a check payable to an imaginary charity, whose
issue an imposter induces, could be characterized as a check payable to a "non-
existing" person so as to fall under the BEA fictitious payee provision.
162. See U.C.C. § 3-404(b) (1999).
163. Id
164. Id
165. U.C.C. § 3-404(b) (2) (1999).
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then, loss generated by the forger of the payee's signature is
allocated to the issuer of the check, rather than to the taker from
the forger, as if the check had originally been issued payable to the
bearer and not to the payee's order.
Undoubtedly, UCC section 3-404(b) traces its roots to the-
fictitious payee provision of the BEA.166 While there is difference
in language, in the final analysis, the impact of each provision is not
substantially different. Consider the following analysis. First, in the
BEA the provision applies to the case where the payee is "a
fictitious or non-existing person.""16 Conversely, under the UCC,
the designated payee is either unintended or fictitious. 168 Obviously,
as a counterpart for "fictitious," "unintended" differs from "non-
existing;" but, as will shortly be shown, the meaning given in the
United States to "unintended" necessitates a meaning for "fictitious"
which differs from that under the BEA. Between the UCC and the
BEA, not only does the scope of the provision not appear to be
identical, but the meaning of a key term also appears to differ.
Second, the BEA is silent as to whose intention determines
whether a check is payable to a fictitious or non-existing person. 169
Conversely, whether a person identified as payee is not intended to
have any interest in the instrument, so as to bring it into subsection
(b)(@, is determined under section 3-110(a) or (b) to which UCC
section 3-404(b) (i) specifically refers. 70 Under section 3-110(a), it is
the signer's intention which is usually determinative."' A narrow
exception is provided for under section 3-110(b), providing that "[i]f
the signature ... is made by automated means, such as a check-
writing machine, the payee of the instrument is determined by the
166. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. The original language was much more
apparent in section 9(3) of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), the
predecessor of UCC Article 3.
167. See supra note 94
168. See U.C.C. S 3-404(b) (1999).
169. See supra note 94.
170. See U.C.C. § 3-404(b)(1) (1999).
171. Where more than one signs on an issuer's behalf, "the instrument is
payable to any person intended by one or more of the signers." U.C.C. S 3-
110(a) (1999).
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intent of the person who supplied the name or identification of the
payee."'7 Either way, the crucial moment for determining the
intention of the relevant person, is that of the signature under
subsection (a) and that of the supply of the name under subsection
(b)." A transformation of an honest intent into a dishonest one,
occurring after the signature or the supply of the name to the
signing machine, will not bring the case into UCC section 3-404(b),
but as will be seen below, UCC section 3-405 may cover the case
anyway. A classic example for the application of UCC section 3-
404(b) (i) is the case where either the signer or the name supplier to
an automated signing machine causes a check to be made out to an
existing individual or entity, that the issuer may or may not own,
without intending the check to be delivered to that payee.
Third, in BEA jurisdictions, case law has defined "fictitious" in
terms of being inserted as payee by way of pretense, without any
intention that payment will be made to him.17 4 This, however,
strongly matches the "unintended" category of section 3-
404(b) (ii)." It follows that the meaning of "fictitious" under UCC
section 3-404(b)(ii) cannot be the same meaning as under the BEA.
Indeed, examples given in the official comment td section 3-404
demonstrate that "fictitious" under the UCC means "imaginary;" 7 6
"fictitious" under the UCC is basically the parallel of the BEA
"non-existing," as determined objectively, irrespective of anyone's
intention. Accordingly, what is "unintended or fictitious" in the
United States is "fictitious or non-existing" under the BEA. For
example, a check payable to "Micky Mouse" will be payable to a
non-existing payee under the BEA and to a fictitious payee under
the UCC. Either way, it will fall within the provision.
Fourth, as indicated, by specifically providing whose intent
172. U.C.C. § 3-110(b) (1999).
173. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-404 cmt. 2, case 2 (1999).
174. This is on the basis of Lord Herschell's classic definition in Bank of
Englandv. Vagliano Bros., 1891 App. Cas. 107, 153 (appeal taken from Eng.); see
also supra Part IV.A.1.
175. See U.C.C. § 3-404(o)(ii) (1999).
176. U.C.C. S 3-404 cmt. 2, cases 1-2 (1999).
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determines the application of section 3-404(b)(i), the UCC
provision is clearer than that of the BEA. Yet, other than in
relation to a name supplier to an automated signing machine under
section 3-110(b), the UCC test for determining whose intention
determines whether the payee is unintended is along similar lines
to the classic pre-Boma1 test for determining whether the payee is
"fictitious" under the BEA. For example, as under the BEA, but in
departure from the UCC's pre-1990 position, 1 7 so far as a "real"
payee is concerned, payroll padding, that is, the supply of a name
to a real person who will consequently sign a check payable to that
name, thereby unknowingly executing the name supplier's
fraudulent design, falls outside the provision. Yet, as will be seen
below, the case still falls into the ambit of UCC section 3-405 to
which the BEA has no counterpart. 179
Fifth, both UCC section 3-404(b) and the BEA fictitious
provision do not cover a check payable to an intended real payee.8
Such a check is payable neither to an unintended nor fictitious
payee under the UCC, nor to a fictitious or non-existing payee
under the BEA. Accordingly, and as indicated, theft followed by
the forgery of the indorsement of the check originally made out to
an intended real payee falls outside of the provisions of both the
UCC and the BEA. Therefore, so far as these provisions are
concerned, loss does not fall on the drawer. Additionally, these
provisions do not apply when the real intended payee is either an
accomplice of or a phony corporation set by the defrauder, whose
intention determines to whom the instrument is payable. However,
in such a case, the fraudulent payee's indorsement is effective and
payment over it is a valid discharge, so that the loss will fall on the
drawer anyway."' On this point, there is no difference between the
177. See Boma MNfg. Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1996),
140 D.L.R.4th 463 (SCC); supra text accompanying note 21.
178. See U.C.C. § 3-405(1)(c) (1989).
179. See U.C.C. § 3-405 (1999).
180. See U.C.C. § 3-404(b) (1999); supra note 94.
181. This may very well be the answer to the query raised by WHITE &
SumlvMMERS, supra note 34, at 583, as to the inapplicability of the provision to such
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UCC and the BEA.
e. Employee's Fraudulent Indorsement: UCC § 3-405
UCC section 3-405 allocates to an employer losses caused when
employees entrusted with checks fraudulently indorse them.8 2 It
applies to checks the employer issues, as well as checks payable to
him.183 It has no parallel in the BEA.
The scope of section 3405, particularly in relation to
identifying the employees and their responsibilities caught within
the ambit of the provision, as well as in relation to other Code
provisions, can be further elaborated as follows:
(1) "Employee" is broadly defined in subsection (a)(1) to include
"an independent contractor and employee of an independent
contractor retained by the employer."''  Presumably corporate
officers are covered as well.
(2) For section 3-405 to apply to a fraudulent indorsement on a
check an employer made out to a third party, the forger/defrauding
employee must have had authority to sign or indorse, prepare or
process instruments for issue, supply information determining the
names or addresses of payees, or control the disposition of such
instruments. For example, an employee authorized to supply
information determining the payee's address could intentionally
replace data and divert a check payable to a real creditor of the
employer to the employee's own address. Upon the check's arrival,
the employee could obtain or collect payment over the payee's
fraudulent indorsement made by that employee. 8
a case. The same result applies to a check issued by a person who possesses
determinative intent to himself. See U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 1, case 2 (1999).
182. See U.C.C. S 3-405 (1999).
183. See id
184. U.C.C. S 3-405(a)(1) (1999).
185. See U.C.C. S 3-405, cmt. 3, case 5 (1999); see also U.C.C. § 3-405, cmt.
3, case 6 (1999) (addressing embezzlement by an employee charged with
authority or control over the disposition of outgoing checks).
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(3) For section 3-405 to apply to a fraudulent indorsement on a
check payable to and received by the employer, the
forger/defrauding employee must have had authority to sign or
process incoming instruments for any purpose, including
bookkeeping or deposit to an account. In addition, section 3-405
covers theft of an incoming check and a bookkeeper's fraudulent
indorsement of it, if the bookkeeper has the authority to post
incoming payments to debtors' accounts with the employer.'86
Conversely, indorsement by an employee who has the authority to
indorse is valid, irrespective and outside of UCC section 3-405, even
when inserted with the view of stealing the incoming check and
diverting its proceeds. Loss will fall on the employer unless the
depositary bank had notice of the employee's breach of a fiduciary
duty as determined under section 3-307.187
(4) In any event, with regard to both outgoing and incoming
checks, the authority to sign, process instruments or information,
and control disposition does not exhaust all cases of "responsibility"
entrusted to an employee whose fraudulent indorsement section 3-
405 validates. Subsection (a)(3)(vi) explicitly states that in addition
to all tasks described above, "responsibility" with respect to
instruments includes the authority "to act otherwise with respect
to instruments in a responsible capacity."' 8 This open-ended
category may not be all that helpful, except for signaling the broad
scope of the provision; the breadth of this residual category
overshadows any narrow interpretation of the particular duties.
Subsection (a) (3) nevertheless provides some assistance, providing
that "'[riesponsibility' does not include authority that merely
allows an employee to have access to instruments or blank or
incomplete instrument forms that are being stored or transported
or are part of incoming or outgoing mail, or similar access. ' 89
Notwithstanding access to a storing facility, a janitor will thus not
be an employee entrusted with responsibility with respect to
186. See U.C.C. § 3-405, cmt. 3, case 3 (1999).
187. See U.C.C. S 3405, cmt. 3, case 4 (1999).
188. U.C.C. § 3-405(a)(3)(vi) (1999).189. U.C.C. § 3-405(a)(3) (1999).
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instruments so that the janitor's fraudulent indorsement falls
outside of section 3-405. In any event, the janitor's employer,
whose negligence might have substantially contributed to the loss,
may nevertheless be held responsible under section 3-406.190
f The Relationship Between § 3-404(b) and -405
Effectively providing for the allocation of forged indorsement
losses to an organization whose insider precipitated the fraud
resulting in the losses, UCC sections 3-404(b) and 405 partly
overlap and partly compliment each other. Thus, when an
employee entrusted with responsibility causes the employer to
generate a check payable to a fictitious, namely imaginary, person,
and then indorses the check in the name of the payee and collects
its proceeds, both provisions validate the indorsement so as to
allocate the loss on the employer. Similarly, both provisions apply
where such an employee is the person whose intent determines to
whom the check is payable, and causes the employer to generate a
check payable to a real person on whom the employee does not
intend to confer any interest in the check. The overlap, however,
is not total. For example, only section 3404(b) will apply in each
of the abovementioned cases if an independent third party, rather
than a defrauding employee, makes the fraudulent indorsement, as
for example, where the third party frustrates the perpetrator's
design by stealing the check, either from the employer or the
employee, and collecting its proceeds for his own benefit.
Conversely, only section 3-405, and not section 3-404(b), applies (@
to a fraudulent indorsement on an incoming check payable to and
received by the employer, and made by an employee entrusted with
responsibility, (ii) to the case where an employee entrusted with
responsibility, who supplies the name of a real person to an honest
co-employee who signs a check payable to that person, makes the
forged indorsement,1 91 as well as (iii) when an employee whose
190. For the inapplicability of UCC section 3-405 to the janitor's case, and
the possible application of section 3-406, see U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 3, case 4 (1999).
191. See U.C.C. S 3-405 cmt. 3, case 7 (1999).
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intent determines to whom a check is payable, having caused the
employer to generate a check payable to a real person, fully
intending him to have an interest in the check, changes his mind
and collects the proceeds of the check over his fraudulent
indorsement.192
C. The Anglo-American System: Concluding Remarks on Negligence
In the Anglo-American system, when an indorsement on a
check has been forged, the true owner may sue prior parties on the
instrument and subsequent parties in conversion (as well as money
had and received under the BEA). The drawer is entitled to have his
account credited (or not debited in the first place) with the amount
of the check. Loss falls on the one who dealt with the forger. Where
an exception to this scheme applies, the taker from the forger
obtains title, and payment to the taker is good discharge. Loss falls
on the one from whom the check was stolen or misappropriated.
The principal features distinguishing the UCC from the BEA
is the extent of the exceptions and the operation, within their
framework, of the comparative negligence rules. UCC exceptions
are based on fault, whether presumed or proved, ability to prevent
loss, and responsibility within one's sphere of influence. The
exceptions thus contribute to loss prevention or reduction and
constitute an improvement in relation to the BEA. At the same
time, the UCC comparative negligence rules do not appear
appropriate to me. First, they may prolong litigation. Second,
comparative negligence rules are likely to require close analysis of
degree of causation, which is precisely the task the substitution of
a "substantially contributed" test for any proximity requirement
seeks to avoid. Third, in many fact situations, the task of
apportioning fault may be impossible.
In addition, a general duty to exercise ordinary care may be too
open-ended. As such, it is likely to unnecessarily prolong litigation
and bolster the position of the stronger party, which, not
192. See U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 3, case 6 (1999).
1785
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1733
infrequently, is a bank. This is an important consideration,
particularly in connection with cases involving consumers and
small businesses. Thus, while the UCC exceptions rest on sound
policies, their proper implementation requires further refinement.
I accordingly propose three modifications to the American
scheme. First, "ordinary care" or reasonable commercial standards
ought to be prescribed in codes of conduct agreed between banks
and customer organizations,193 in a process that government may
facilitate. Such codes of conduct may be national, regional, or even
limited to specific sectors. 9 4
Second, I propose to eliminate the application of comparative
negligence rules. In this respect, I am inspired by the pre-1990
principle of absolute preclusion, but the scheme I have in mind is
not necessarily identical to that of the old UCC. My proposal is
that the failure by the person who dealt with the forger to comply
with reasonable commercial standards will nullify an otherwise
applicable exception and restore the ineffectiveness of the
indorsement, provided such compliance could have detected the
forgery and prevented the loss. Under such circumstances, the
failure to comply will serve as a basis for preclusion of anyone
relying on the exception. Usually, the one who dealt with the
forger is either a bank or a check cashing facility, whose compliance
with reasonable commercial standards will not be hard to
determine, particularly in the context of a code of conduct along
the lines set out above. The negligence of any party, other than the
one who has dealt with the forger, will be considered too remote to
be a relevant factor.195
193. Rules prescribed in such codes will fulfil the same function of UCC
sections 3-404 and -405.
194. For example, there may be different standards for large businesses, small
businesses, and non-profit organizations. At the same time, some common
elements, for example, in scrutinizing employees, may exist across the board. For
a proposed publicly supervised negotiated statutory standard form contract, see
Reuben Hasson, The Unconscionability Business-A Comment on Tilden-Rent-a-
Car Co. v. Clendenning, 3 CAN. BUS. Lj. 193, 196-98 (1979).
195. Notwithstanding Trust Co. of Ga. Bank NA. v. Port Terminal &
Warehousing Co., 266 S.E. 2d 254 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980), where the court was less
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Third, I propose to eliminate all exceptions in connection with
consumer checks, or at least for most of their categories.
Alternatively, some rules which are to be retained are to be
modified in the consumer context.196 Regardless, under my
proposal, anyone who fails to disclose a forged indorsement known
to him will be unable to shift the loss onto another.
V. EVOLUTION AND REFORM: COMMON LAW OR LAW
MERCHANT?
Until recently, the conventional wisdom has been that one
underlying distinction between law merchant and common law is
concerned with the protection of property rights. While common
law emphasizes static protection of existing property rights, law
merchant prefers interests created by means of free circulation of
instruments, and hence the dynamic protection accorded to their
bona fide acquirer. Accordingly, it is tempting to point out that so
far as the basic scheme for the allocation of forged indorsement
losses is concerned, while the Continental system, which protects
the bona fide acquirer, reflects principles derived from law
merchant, the Anglo-American system, which protects the
dispossessed owner, implements common law principles.
More recently, however, in his landmark book,' Professor
Rogers presents a convincing case for a revisionist view, that
challenges the conventional wisdom in two ways. First, he dispels
the myth of the law merchant as a distinct and cohesive body of law
which supplanted the common law but was alien to it in its basic
principles and concepts. Rather, in Professor Rogers' view, first, the
true process of incorporating the law merchant was the adaptation
categorical on this point.
196. For example, even if the impostor rule under section 3-404(a) is retained
with respect to consumers, I propose to exclude from its operation a consumer
who took the precaution of writing the check to the alleged principal of the
impostor (as, in effect, was the general rule under the pre-1990 UCC).
197. See JAMES S. ROGERS, EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND
NOTES (.H. Baker, ed., 1995).
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of the common law to cover, within its own doctrine, either new
commercial instruments or new uses of old ones. Second,
historically, within this process, the role of negotiability, or the free
circulation of commercial instruments, was by no means central.
It is obvious that from this point of view, it is inappropriate to
deal with the treatment of forged indorsement losses in the Anglo-
American system as a case where common law property rules
prevailed over law merchant free circulation rules. Rather, the
correct point of view is to characterize the case as an instance where
the better policies necessitated the law to prefer the protection of
property, unless the dispossessed owner has been at some fault or
is in a position to avoid loss. Nevertheless, as long as the subject
matter remains a commercial situation that has to be dealt with
under rules implementing the preferable policy, it is commercial
law, or law merchant, which resolves the issue. In the final analysis,
it is this redefinition of commercial law which can be deduced from
Rogers' thesis"'8 and applied to the evolution of the law governing
the allocation of forged check indorsement losses.
198. See id
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